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NOTES
THE PROPOSED CABLE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF 1975: A RECOMMENDATION FOR
COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION
In recognition of the increasing importance of the cable television
industry,1 the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP)2 has drafted
a bill entitled "The Cable Communications Act of 1975." This bill,
if enacted by Congress,3 will amend the Communications Act of 19344
to provide the first comprehensive statutory regulation of cable TV
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE: REPORT TO THE PRns-
iDENT (1974) [hereinafter cited as CCR];
FCC CABLE TELEVISION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL/STATE-LocAL REGULA-
TORY RELATIONSHIPS (1973) [hereinafter cited as FSLAC];
R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGowAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION
(1973) [hereinafter cited as NOLL];
SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION
OF ABUNDANCE (1971) [hereinafter cited as SLOAN COMM'N];
"Services" vol., TELEVISION DGEST, TELEVISION FACIBOOK No. 44 (1974-75 ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as TELEVISION FAcTBOOK];
Federal Communications Comm'n, Cable Television Report and Order, printed in
37 Fed. Reg. 3252, 36 F.C.C.2d 141, 24 P & F RADIO REo. 2d 1501 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Cable Television Report and Order];
Federal Communications Comm'n, Clarification of the Cable Television Rules and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Inquiry, printed in 39 Fed. Reg. 14,288, 46 F.C.C.
2d 175, 29 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1621 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Clarification];
Memorandum from Henry Goldberg, General Counsel of the OTP, to William V.
Skidmore, January 10, 1975, on the subject of the Cable Communications Act of 1975
(responding to comments on the first draft of the Act and explaining revisions)
[hereinafter cited as Goldberg Memorandum];
Proposed Cable Communications Act of 1975, on file at the business office of the
Duke Law Journal, Durham, North Carolina [hereinafter cited as Proposed Act].
1. In 1964, there were 1,200 operating cable systems, serving 1,085,000 subscribers;
by 1974, these numbers had grown to 3,158 systems and 8,700,000 subscribers. TELE-
VISION FACTBOOK 71-a.
2. The OTP is currently a branch of the Executive Office of the President. See
47 C.F.R. §§ 201.0 et seq. (1973). See also Exec. Order No. 11,556, 3 C.F.R. 283
(1974).
3. After having been revised from an earlier version in the light of comments re-
ceived from various government agencies and from industry, the bill is currently await-
ing final approval by the Office of Management and Budget.
4. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
5. This area is now extensively regulated by the FCC, and to a lesser extent by
state and local governments. See notes 13-26 infra and accompanying text.
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It is the purpose of this Note to measure the proposed legislation
against the objectives which such a regulatory scheme should serve.
First, it will be necessary to give a brief technical explanation of cable
TV. The Note will then describe the various types of regulations cur-
rently enforced by the FCC and by state and local governments. Next,
a summary of the bill will be presented. The final section will evaluate
the bil's most significant provisions and make suggestions for improve-
ment.
WHAT IS CABLE TELEVISION? 6
In contrast to regular TV, which is broadcast as a radio signal and
received through the viewer's antenna, cable TV more nearly re-
sembles a telephone system. Programming is sent from the origination
end, or "head end," of a main trunk cable which serves smaller arteries
called "feeders"; individual homes are reached from the feeders by
"drops" which enter residences in a manner similar to telephone wires.
There are three methods by which programs may be placed on
the cable at the head end. The oldest method in use today is for a
cable operator to receive broadcast signals on his own antennas and re-
transmit them to his subscribers. This method originally was used to
improve service to individual viewers in an area of poor broadcast re-
ception; a more recent, and more controversial, use of this method is
for a cable operator to construct highly efficient antennas and relay fa-
cilities and "import" the stations normally received in some other area.7
The second method is called "origination cablecasting," which simply
means that a cable operator originates his own programs at the head
end in much the same manner as a local broadcast station which pro-
vides original programming. Third, it is possible for cable programs
to be originated by a network and transmitted to cable operators, who
then would be able to restrict the reception of these programs to their
subscribers."
The most important characteristic of cable TV, and its greatest ad-
vantage in comparison with broadcast television, is the multiplicity of
channels. The possibilities of expanding regular TV are greatly lim-
6. See generally CABlLE TELVISION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE: AN OVERVIEW
5-8 (1972).
7. The "importation" of distant signals described here is currently restricted by
FCC regulations. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59-.63 (1973). See also id. §§ 76.91-.159. See
text accompanying notes 66-75 infra.
8. Such "networking" would probably be associated with an "interconnection serv-
ice" which would permit the direct exchange of programs among the head ends of differ-
ent cable systems; however, the networking could consist of a simple one-way distribu-
tion from the network to the cable systems' head ends with no other interconnection.
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ited by the technical aspects of radio signals. In a given locality, only
one broadcast station can use a particular frequency band,9 and because
of possible interference there generally may not be even two stations
on adjacent channels. 10 Furthermore, the number of channels avail-
able in one locality may be limited by the risk of interference resulting
from assigning the same channels to nearby localities. In contrast, a
cable system can carry numerous channels and generally use adjacent
channels. Therefore, the use of cable requires the preemption of
fewer frequency bands than equivalent broadcast programming. Uti-
lized to their fullest extent, cable systems could retransmit all the local
broadcast stations, import distant stations, originate local programs,
dedicate channels to a wide variety of public uses,'1 and yet use no
more of the limited frequency spectrum than a broadcast system which
would provide many fewer services. As the demand for use of the
frequency spectrum continues to increase, 2 this factor could become
extremely important in any challenge which cable TV might eventually
make to the supremacy of broadcast TV.
9. As a result, it is technically unworkable to have more than seven channels in
the VHF (very high frequency) part of the spectrum (channels 2 through 13). The
UHF (ultra high frequency) part of the spectrum (channels 14 through 83) could pro-
vide for a greater, though still limited, expansion of broadcast TV, but the development
of UHF TV has been hampered by many problems. Many homes with UHF reception
lack the proper antennas; UHF stations generally have low power transmitters with a
resulting limitation of the signal's range and clarity; UHF radio waves are more nearly
line-of-sight than VHF and therefore have a shorter range; and the older UHF continu-
ous tuners are not so conveniently used as the click-stop tuner on VHF channels. See
R. PARK, CABLE TELEVISION AND UHF BROADCASTrNG 8 (1971).
10. SLOAN COMM'N 17. Because of frequency gaps between channels 4 and 5 and
between channels 6 and 7 of the VHF system, neither of these pairs consists of adjacent
channels, and therefore both members of either pair can be used.
11. Many educational programs could be offered by using cable to provide a city-
wide closed circuit system. A continuing program of medical education (including ca-
blecasts of surgery and other techniques), further legal training, and programs for local
police and fire departments are only a few of the possibilities. See generally SLOAN
COMIM'N 102-10; R. SmrrH, TAm WmED NATION 86-88 (1972). Also, because of the
large number of channels available, the marginal cost of channel time should be low
enough that cultural programming, which is too costly for broadcast TV, might be eco-
nomical on cable TV. Broadcast TV, having so few channels, must appeal to mass au-
diences, whereas cable TV, with its abundance of channels, can afford to devote some
channels to smaller audiences and indeed must do so to maximize profits. See NOLL
50-53.
12. This demand comes from widely diverse sources, including mobile telephones,
mobile-service radios for vehicles such as taxis, and for various intra-corporation uses,
in addition to radio and TV broadcasters. See generally SLOAN COMM'N 17, 20-22. Tel-
evision makes particularly hard demands on the available frequencies. One color TV
channel uses as broad a band of the frequency spectrum as 240 FM or 600 AM radio
stations. R. COLL & M. BoTEiN, CABLE TELEVISION: TAPPING THE POTENTI 28
(1972).
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PRESENT REGULATION OF CABLE TV
The promising medium of cable TV is currently regulated by the
FCC,'3 by a large number of local governments, and by several of the
states. State intervention in this area has been rare and usually lim-
ited in scope to the coordination of cable regulation and, in a few cases,
to specific measures aimed at corruption and lack of expertise in local
governments. 4 Because of the absence of state preemption in this
area, local governments have been able to exercise wide authority over
matters not regulated by the FCC. Their most important power has
been the discretion to grant the franchises authorizing cable operators
the use of public rights of way. 5
Regulation by the FCC derives from the fact -that cable systems
retransmit broadcast signals.16 The present FCC regulations' 7 broadly
cover the most important aspects of cable communications. They pro-
hibit cable operations without FCC approval' 8 and also affect approval
at the local level by imposing certain requirements upon cable licensing
authorities regarding licensee selection and franchise agreements. 9 In
addition, -the regulations place certain restrictions upon the importation
of outside signals and require that all locally available stations be re-
transmitted.20 They also protect "exclusivity"; that is, they permit a
13. The FCC's regulatory authority is exercised pursuant to the Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970). The leading Supreme Court cases defin-
ing the extent of this authority are United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649
(1972) (upholding an FCC requirement that large cable systems must originate pro-
gramming), and United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (uphold-
ing FCC power to regulate cable TV). Most of the cable regulations are included in
47 C.F.R. H9 76.1 et seq. (1973).
14. See generally Barnett, State, Federal, and Local Regulation of Cable Television,
47 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 685, 687, 690-708 (1972).
15. See id. at 685-86.
16. The FCC apparently concedes that its present authority would not extend to ca-
ble systems which originate all their programming. The present FCC regulations ex-
clude such systems from their coverage by defining "cable television system" to include
only systems that retransmit broadcast signals. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1973).
17. The main body of these regulations can be found in 47 C.F.R. § 76.1 et seq.
(1973), originally issued with Cable Television Report and Order. For more complete
discussions of the FCC regulations, see S. RiviN, CABLE TELEVISION: A GumE TO Fr)-
RAL REGULATIONS (1973); Comment, Federal and State Regulations of Cable Televi-
sion: An Analysis of the New FCC Rules, 1971 Dux LJ. 1151.
18. 47 C.F.R. § 76.11 (1973).
19. Id. § 76.31. "Reasonable duration" is the general requirement for the length
of a franchise. The FCC has stated that normally "a franchise should not exceed 15
years." Cable Television Report and Order 1182. The FCC is considering a minimum
length requirement of five to seven years. Clarification I 73-74.
20. Signals can be imported to provide programming from all three networks and
as many as five independent signals. This latter figure varies with the size of the mar-
ket served by the cable system and with the number of local independent stations. 47
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broadcaster to be the exclusive source of network or syndicated pro-
gramming.21  Further requirements are that cable systems provide
three "dedicated" free channels for specified public purposes, 22 and
that cable systems originate cablecasting.23 Originated cablecasting is
subject to some content regulation.2 4  Finally, the FCC has placed
some restrictions on ownership, forbidding cable systems to have any
interest either in a TV network or in a TV broadcast station serving
the same area as the cable system.2 5 Similar restrictions on telephone
company ownership of cable TV systems in the area served by the tele-
phone company are in effect.2 6
Since 1970, there has been considerable activity directed toward
the formulation of a comprehensive national policy. At the agency
level, the Federal/State-Local Advisory Committee (FSLAC) appointed
by the FCC in 1971 has issued a report expressing its view
of the ideal allocation of governmental authority in the cable area.'
A Cabinet Committee was appointed by the President in the same
year, 2  and its Cabinet Committee Report proposed a fundamental
C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b), .61(b), (c), .63(a) (1973). Extremely small communities (those
outside broadcast TV market areas) may import without restriction. Id. § 76.57(b).
21. Id. §§ 76.91-.159. For a discussion of the specific exclusivity provisions, see
R. PARK, THn ExcLUsvrrY PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMIS-
SION'S CABLE TELEVISION REGULATIONS 1-2 (1972).
22. One channel each must be dedicated to public access, local education authorities,
and local government. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.251 (a) (4)-(6) (1973).
23. Id. § 76.201. However, this requirement is applicable only to cable systems
with at least 3,500 subscribers. In June 1974, it applied to 687 of the 3,190 systems
in operation. See TELEVISION FAcrBOoK 72-a.
24. Cablecasting is subject to the requirement that conflicting views be offered on
important public issues, that anyone personally attacked be entitled to respond (except
in cases of attack on political candidates by opponents, attacks on foreigners, and attacks
that are part of bona fide newscasts), and that any political candidate who is attacked,
or whose opponent is endorsed, in an editorial be allowed to respond. 47 C.F.R. §
76.209 (1973).
25. Id. § 76.501(a). This regulation, if interpreted literally, only prohibits cable
systems from owning or having an interest in the networks or in broadcast stations serv-
ing the same area as the cable system: "No cable television system. . . shall carry the
signal of any television broadcast station if such system directly or indirectly owns, op-
erates, controls, or has an interest in a [network or local broadcaster]." Id. However,
it seems to be generally construed to mean the converse--networks and local broadcast-
ers may not own the cable system. See Federal Communications Comm'n, Cable Tele-
vision Cross-Ownership, 38 Fed. Reg. 2970, 2976, 39 F.C.C.2d 377, 391, 26 P & F RA-
DIo REG. 2D 739, 753 (1973) (memorandum opinion and order).
26. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-.57, 64.601-.602 (1974).
27. The FSLAC report covered twenty-nine subject areas. See FSLAC 11-28.
There was bitter disagreement over the wisdom and constitutionality of the report's con-
clusion that states and localities should not be allowed to regulate the same aspects of
cable TV, a proposal passed by a vote of twelve to seven. Id. at 30.
28. Members were the Secretaries of Commerce (Peter G. Peterson, who replaced
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scheme of governmental regulation. The culmination of these efforts
is the proposed Act drafted by the OTP. The OTP's director and staff
were closely involved with the earlier Cabinet Committee, 29 and the
proposed Act generally follows the Committee's recommendations3 0
THE PROPOSED ACT: AN OVERvIEw
Under the OTP bill, a cable system could not operate without both
a license from a state or local licensing authority31 and a certificate from
the FCC.32  The license may be granted only after fair and open pro-
ceedings33 by an entity having exclusive authority to regulate cable
TV.34  The effect of this latter provision is to require that either the
state or the local government assume full power over the nonfederal
aspects of cable TV.35 Licenses issued by this authority may last from
five to twenty years and must not be exclusive.3 6  Notable among the
specific provisions is a requirement that cable operators make at least
half of their channels available for lease;3 7 the licensing authority itself
may require an even higher proportion. 8 Once he has received a li-
Maurice Stans), HEW (Elliot L. Richardson), and HUD (George Romney), as well as
presidential advisors Herbert Klein, Leonard Garment, and Robert H. Finch. The Di-
rector of the OTP, Clay T. Whitehead, served as Chairman of the Committee. CCR
3 n.1.
29. The OTP's Director chaired the Committee, and the OTP staff did the Commit-
tee's staff work. CCR 3 n.l.
30. The proposed Act is "intended to implement certain of the recommendations of
the [Cabinet Committee]." Goldberg Memorandum 1.
31. Proposed Act § 302.
32. Id. § 202.
33. Id. § 303(a).
34. Id. § 301.
35. Therefore, the OTP bill basically approves the "Federal Plus One" regulatory
scheme adopted by a 12-7 majority of the FSLAC. See note 134 infra.
36. Proposed Act § 303(c).
37. This result is compelled by two of the proposed subsections. An operator is re-
quired to make available for lease any channels beyond those necessary to retransmit
signals as required by the FCC, to provide a public access channel, and to originate pro-
grams on two channels. Id. § 303(f). Subsection 303(e) requires that newly con-
structed systems have enough capacity so that as many channels will be available for
lease as are used by the operator for retransmissions or originations. Id. § 303 (e). The
effect of both requirements is that half of the channels must be available for lease.
The construction requirement of section 303 (e) by its terms applies only to systems
constructed or substantially modified after the effective date of the Act. However, a
similar result is required for existing systems under the FCC rules, which require that
all systems have an equivalent channel for each channel used for retransmitting broad-
cast signals, 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (2) (1973). This provision is narrower than that of
the bill, since the proposed Act will require equivalent channels also for each used by
the operator for program originations, but the effects will be comparable.
38. Proposed Act § 303(g).
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cense, a cable operator may obtain the requisite FCC certificate upon
compliance with the appropriate rules promulgated by the FCC.89
The OTP bill both modifies and adds to -the ownership restrictions
already imposed by FCC regulations. 40  The opportunity for telephone
companies to own cable systems will continue to be severely limited.4'
However, it appears that the current restriction against national net-
works will be relaxed.42 Substantial use restrictions are also placed
on ownership by newspaper or magazine publishers43 and broad-
casters.44 Similar use restrictions are placed on the owners of multiple
systems.45
The bill would allow the Commission to set technical standards
for cable systems, 46 as well as permitting FCC protection of equal em-
ployment opportunity47 and cable operators' access to rights of way.48
Unlike the current regulatory scheme, however, no authority would be
allowed to control the content of programs originated on cable TV; in
particular, the equal time, fairness, and balance rules are expressly re-
jected.49 Nor would the present "dedicated channels" requirement"
be preserved in the bill, which at most would permit a licensing au-
thority to require cable operators to provide free time on one public
access channel.51 There would be no regulation of the rates charged
by operators to channel lessees (at least, not for a ten-year period) or
of the rates charged by channel programmers for advertising and pay-
39. Id. § 203 (a).
40. See notes 84-102 infra and accompanying text.
41. Proposed Act § 203(b) (3). However, telephone companies may install trans-
mission facilities and lease them to the operators. Id.
42. Id. § 204(d). This section provides that networks cannot be prohibited from
owning a cable system if their use is limited to the channels needed to carry broadcast
stations that are required to be retransmitted, a public access channel, and one channel
for program origination by the operator.
43. Id. § 401(d). The restrictions are the same as those described in note 42 supra,
except that two channels would be allowed for program origination by the operator.
44. Id. § 204(d). The restrictions are the same as those described in note 42 supra.
45. Id. § 401(d). The restrictions are the same as those described in note 42 supra,
except that two channels would be allowed for program origination by the operator.
46. Id. § 203(b)(1). This section requires the FCC to set "technical standards
necessary to promote the compatibility and interoperability of cable systems, the com-
patability of the receivers or other terminal equipment connected to such systems by ca-
ble subscribers, and to prevent harmful interference to radio communications."
47. Id. § 204(c).
48. Id. § 204(b).
49. Id. § 401(a). Contrarily, the present FCC rules require a presentation of con-
flicting views on public issues and provide for a right of response. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209
(1973). See note 24 supra.
50. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(4)-(6) (1973).
51. Proposed Act § 401(b).
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cable service, but the operator's charges to subscribers for regular serv-
ice may be fixed by the licensing authority.52 Operators may be sub-
jected to no taxes or fees other than those common to other businesses,
with the exception of "reasonable fees" imposed upon issuance of the
license and the FCC certificate.53
The bill would allow litigants to sue the operator and the licensing
authority in state courts,54 and it authorizes the federal district courts
to hear those cases without regard to diversity of citizenship or to the
amount in controversy.55 Individual subscribers would also be pro-
tected by certain restrictions on cable-tapping and the disclosure of per-
sonally identifiable information. 6
AN EVALUATION OF THE BILL
The General Approach
By far .the most fundamental issue which should underlie any
formulation of a national cable policy is the extent to which adequate
development of cable TV is in the national interest. As the following
analysis of the proposed Act will show, almost every major statutory
decision must be made in light of how Congress addresses this basic
policy question. Certainly the most troublesome aspect of this problem
is how to treat broadcasters' claims that cable TV should be restricted
in the public interest because of the threat which it poses to broadcast
TV. In general, the conclusion of this Note is that the broadcasters'
arguments are weak and that controversies which arise should usually
be resolved in favor of the maximum development of cable TV.
Broadcasters fear that cable systems will reduce the number of
viewers for local broadcast stations; indeed, it is not unreasonable for
them to suppose that many stations will each have smaller audiences
when television owners can choose from more channels. Nevertheless,
the evidence seems to be that cable TV will probably have little effect
on most broadcasters and will certainly not destroy broadcasting al-
together.5 7  In fact, some stations may benefit from the development
52. Id. § 401(f).
53. Id. § 401(c).
54. Id. § 501.
55. Id. § 502.
56. Id. § 503. It will be unlawful to intercept cable communications without the
consent of the sender; it will also be unlawful for the cable operator or any channel
programmer to disclose personally identifiable information about a subscriber, such as
what programs he watches, without either the subscriber's consent or a court order. See
text accompanying notes 128-31 infra.
57. See R. PAPK, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CABLE GROWTH ON TELEVISION BROADCAST-
ING 77 (1970). Such effects will be felt most strongly in smaller towns. Id. at 80.
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of cable TV, particularly those whose audiences will increase as a result
of importation by cable systems and UHF stations whose technical
disadvantages are cancelled on the cable.-8  Furthermore, some broad-
cast stations will undoubtedly be needed to serve areas where cable TV
is uneconomical. 59
Even admitting the possibility that cable TV might destroy or ser-
iously injure broadcast interests, one must still conclude that these con-
tingencies do not justify restricting ithe development of cable TV. The
broadcasters' arguments are based both upon the alleged injustice of
allowing their investments -to be diminished and the damage which they
claim will be done to the public interest. The former argument is es-
pecially unimpressive. Every businessman faces the possibility that his
product will become obsolete when it faces superior competition; this
fact is not generally recognized as a valid reason for imposing artificial
restraints upon potential rivals. There is simply no reason for making
an exception to this rule for the benefit of TV broadcasters, especially
in view of the fact that they paid only a nominal sum for their most
valuable asset: their broadcasting license.60
Arguments based upon the public interest have somewhat more
substance but cannot withstand close analysis. The contentions are
that cable TV would destroy local programming and infringe upon the
rights of those who do not subscribe to cable TV. As to the former
claim, even ignoring the fact that the current FCC-sponsored local serv-
ice doctrine61 has resulted in little local programming, 62 one should
realize that there will probably be more local programs on cable TV.
After all, the abundance of channels will make more programs possible
and reduce the marginal cost of programming each channel; one likely
58. The independent UHF stations stand to benefit at least in the short term be-
cause, on the cable, the limiting line-of-sight characteristics of UHF will not matter
since the cable operator can receive the signal on specialized antennas and amplify it
before putting it on the cable; homes with no UHF antenna will be able to receive UHF
on the cable; UHF programs can be placed on the cable in such a way that they are
tuned in by use of the click-stop VHF channel selector on the TV set, instead of the
UHF channel selector, which on many sets is a less convenient tuner. See id. at 74-
77; Barnett & Greenberg, Regulating CATV Systems: An Analysis of FCC Policy and
an Alternative, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PRon. 562, 576 (1969).
59. Cable TV may be prohibitively expensive in extremely rural areas which have
potential audience of very few subscribers for the miles of wire needed to reach them.
See NOLL 197.
60. See generally id. at 53-54.
61. See Federal Communication Comnm'n, Sixth Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg.
3905, 3913, 41 FCC 148, 171-72 (1952). See generally NOLL 99-120 (discussion of
the local service doctrine).
62. See NoLL 108-10.
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result is that local programs with less mass appeal would become suf-
ficiently profitable to survive. In evaluating the argument which relies
upon the rights of nonsubscribers, one must first concede that such per-
sons do have a legitimate interest in the continued availability of broad-
cast TV. The fallacy of the claim is due to the fact that, if a substantial
number of people fall into this category, enough broadcasters would
remain to meet this demand.63 If the demand would really be so small
that it would not support even a few broadcasters, there is no apparent
reason why the nation should forego the full advantages of cable TV
in deference to so trifling a demand.
As a starting point, the following analysis of specific provisions will
assume that Congress should adopt a firm policy in favor of the maxi-
mum development of cable TV. 4  The arguments which have been
advanced against such development are too insubstantial to overcome
the public benefits which full exploitation of cable TV as a medium
could provide. 5 Anyone who proposes a specific restriction upon
cable TV's potential should have the burden of showing that it is clearly
in the national interest to forego some of these benefits.
Retransmission of Signals
It is in the area of cable TV retransmissions of broadcast signals
that the conflict between entrenched broadcasting interests and the fur-
ther development of cable TV is perhaps the strongest. Local broad-
casters especially fear the competition of signals "imported" from other
areas. Purely from the viewpoint of the broadcasters' self-interest, this
fear is not unfounded; the evidence in fact shows that the cable audi-
ence increases in proportion to the number of imported stations.80 The
more appropriate question, however, is whether a particular limitation
upon retransmission would serve a public interest apart from the pro-
tection of local broadcasters' revenues.
63. According to one estimate, the highest plausible cable penetration is seventy-five
percent of the nation's homes. Id. at 160, table 6-3. If this is correct, the development
of cable TV would leave twenty-five percent of the population dependent upon broad-
cast TV. While this is not a small number, the problem would be better met if the
FCC allowed the development of regional stations with powerful transmitters and relay
equipment which could reach enough nonsubscribers to be profitable. Even if some pub-
lic subsidies proved to be necessary, this solution would strike the best balance between
the interests of cable subscribers and nonsubscribers. For a brief description of re-
gional stations, see id. at 101.
64. For recommendations supporting the development of cable TV, see SLoAN
COMM'N 173; CCR 16. See also Proposed Act § 103(a) (one purpose of the Act is
"to allow the growth and development of cable communications").
65. R. SMITH, supra note 11, at 14-21. See notes 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
66. See NoLL 153-55.
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The proposed Act would give the FCC broad powers to regulate
the retransmission of broadcast signals by cable operators or channel
programmers.17  In the exercise of this power, the FCC could require
the retransmission of certain stations or programs and forbid the re-
transmission of others. It is a major weakness of the proposed Act that
no distinction is drawn between the power to require and the power
to forbid retransmission, since substantially different policy issues are
raised by these two types of regulation. Flexible authority in the FCC
to require retransmission is desirable as a means of assuring that cable
systems at least begin to live up to their potential. To this end, the
FCC could use such powers to require that a specified minimum service
be provided by each cable system."" For example, an appropriate reg-
ulation today might require that cable systems carry all three networks
and a certain number of independent broadcasters. Because of the
changes which will inevitably accompany such a rapidly developing
medium, the drafters of the proposed Act chose wisely in giving the
FCC flexible powers rather than imposing a statutory standard which
might quickly become inappropriate.
On the other hand, the power to limit the retransmission of sta-
tions or programs can be exercised only to prevent cable TV from
achieving its full potential. The only beneficiaries of such rules would
be those local broadcasters who wish to restrain the competition of
cable TV. Frequently, the public interest in the greatest variety and
highest quality of programming would suffer. For example, a cable
operator would not be likely to undergo the effort and expense of im-
porting a distant signal unless he believed that the station or program
would find at least a certain number of viewers."9 If he miscalculated
the probable audience, he would generally discontinue the station or
program rather than suffer a loss. A low audience for an imported
program would result either from the program's inherent lack of appeal
67. The source of this power is section 204(a), which grants the FCC the authority
to "establish by rule or regulation the terms and conditions respecting the retransmis-
sion of radio and television broadcast signals by cable system operators or channel pro-
grammers. . . ." Proposed Act § 204(a).
68. The present FCC rules do not impose any minimum service standards beyond
requiring that all locally available stations be retransmitted. Further minimum service
is optional. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. The purpose of the requirement
that locally available stations be retransmitted is to prevent a cable operator from delib-
erately damaging a particular broadcast station by carrying only its competitors. The
language of section 204(a) is broad enough to allow the retention of this rule. See note
67 supra.
69. The general popularity of imported programming is shown by the correspond-
ence of the size of cable audiences with the number of imported stations. See NoLL
153-55.
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or from the competition of superior broadcast programming. There is
no apparent reason to disturb the natural operation of ithis market pro-
cess in which cable and broadcast TV would compete without artificial
advantages or disadvantages. To allow restrictions upon importing
would leave the FCC with the power to protect broadcasters against
superior cable programming, to the detriment of the viewing public.70
Similarly, one must reject the contention that the FCC should be al-
lowed to prevent cable systems from importing a station whose pro-
gramming largely duplicates that of a local station. The FCC appar-
ently agrees with this contention, since its exclusivity rules effectively
forbid this practice. 71 However, it seems unlikely that a cable operator
would import a signal merely to duplicate programming that was
already available locally. He would probably not be motivated to im-
port the signal unless the distant station were in some way superior to
the local station and therefore might possibly attract some of the local
audience. If a cable system could thus provide better service than local
broadcasters offering the same program, the public interest in quality
TV would be better served by allowing importation.
For the same reasons, the FCC should be denied the power to
retain the "leapfrogging" rules72 which it currently imposes in those sit-
uations where importation of distant signals is allowed. Under these
rules, cable systems are required to import only -the nearest station of-
fering the desired programming.73  The rationale, according to the
FCC, is that otherwise most cable systems would import only stations
from the largest cities, with a consequent lack of "general participation
70. Perhaps there is a feeling that allowing importation of distant signals would
leave some local broadcasters in an unequal contest with big-city stations which can at-
tract the best programming and talent. This would not change the balance of equities,
however, since a portion of the public should not be assigned inferior programming
merely because of residence location when cable TV is capable of providing even a small
town the program quality and diversity available in metropolitan areas.
71. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.91-.13 (1973). These rules require that a cable system
black out network or syndicated programs and some non-network services which dupli-
cate those being offered by a local broadcaster. The exact provisions depend upon the
size of the TV market in which the cable system is located. See generally R. PARK,
supra note 21, at 1-2.
72. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b), .61(b), (c), .63(a) (1973).
73. An imported network station must be the nearest one of the appropriate net-
works, or the nearest one in the same state as the cable system. As to the independents
imported, the first two may come from anywhere, except that if one comes from one
of the twenty-five largest markets, then it must come from one of the two closest of
those twenty-five largest markets. The third imported signal must be a UHF located
within 200 miles, if there is one; if there is no UHF station within 200 miles, the third
imported independent station must be either any UHF independent, or a VHF independ-
ent located within 200 miles. See id.
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by broadcast television stations in the benefits of cable carriage." 4
This reasoning apparently accepts the premise that the public's interest
in the best service is less important than the "benefits" which certain
broadcasters might have to forego because of an inability to offer a su-
perior product.
It is evident that the FCC has, in general, used its powers over
importation to favor broadcasting interests by compelling the public to
accept programming which might not survive under natural market con-
ditions. In so doing, the Commission has struck the wrong balance.
The proposed Act should rectify this by a specific qualification upon
the FCC's powers under the retransmission clause, to the effect that
no limitations may be imposed on which, or how many, signals may be
imported.75
Channel Capacity
The heart of the OTP bill's channel capacity provision is section
303(e) which requires that if a system is built or substantially modified
after the effective date of the bill, the system must have "channel ca-
pacity of at least one equivalent channel for every channel intended to
be used by the cable operator" 0 for retransmissions and program
originations.77  For example, a cable operator who intends to retrans-
74. Cable Television Report and Order 92.
75. Two other sections of the proposed Act which have an indirect effect upon im-
portation are sections 204(d) and 401(d). Section 204(d) subjects cable systems to
whatever rules the FCC might promulgate concerning common ownership or control of
cable systems and TV broadcasters or networks, unless the systems accept severe limita-
tions. The provision would restrict them to the FCC's required broadcast signals, one
public access channel, and program originations on one channel. The remaining chan-
nels must be made available for lease to channel programmers unaffiliated with the cable
operator. Proposed Act § 204(d). The second is section 401(d), which permits licens-
ing authorities or the FCC to prohibit or limit ownership by newspaper or magazine
publishers or by persons with ownership interests in other cable systems, unless the sys-
tems accept those same severe limitations (except that these systems would be allowed
two channels, not just one, for program originations). Id. § 401(d).
The purpose of these provisions is to reduce the operator's control of programming.
See Goldberg Memorandum 10 & 18. Even assuming that this control poses a real dan-
ger, there is nevertheless no reason to restrict importation, since imported channels are
programmed by their broadcasters, not by the cable operator. The danger that an oper-
ator might import only those programs with which he agreed politically is not increased
if the operator has interests in other media. There would thus seem to be no reason
for not allowing free importation in the circumstances covered by sections 204(d) and
401(d).
76. Proposed Act § 303(e).
77. Under the OTP bill, the FCC can prescribe the number of radio and TV broad-
cast signals that the cable operator must retransmit. Id. § 204(a). See notes 67-68 su-
pra and accompanying text. The operator must have capacity to transmit these signals.
Id. § 303(g) (2). Also, the cable operator is permitted to have not less than two chan-
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mit three local television stations and to originate programs on two
channels must construct a system capable of transmitting ten channels.
There are no provisions allowing any agency to force the expansion of
systems already in existence when the bill becomes effective. Nor
does the bill allow the establishment of minimum channel capacity re-
quirements for existing or future systems.78
This resolution of the problem of assuring that sufficient channel
capacity is available reflects the philosophy of the OTP bill 9 that these
decisions should be based on market forces and that the operator
should estimate the market, 0 rather than having it defined by govern-
ment regulation. As a result, the OTP bill is radically different from
the current FCC regulations. FCC regulations now require that cable
systems in the major TV markets have at least a twenty channel capa-
city.8 The FCC has also promulgated a regulation that would force
an operator to add channels if demand exceeded the channels avail-
able.8 2
Although the FCC regulations and the OTP bill use different ap-
proaches to insure sufficient capacity, it seems likely that they will
achieve approximately the same results. In most major markets, the
cable operator probably would want to use at least ten stations for re-
transmissions and program originations; thus, under the OTP bill he
would have to have a system with a twenty channel capacity, the current
minimum FCC requirement. As for areas outside of major markets,
the FCC has no minimum channel capacity requirements; s thus, the
nels available for program origination. Id. Thus, the cable operator does not have com-
plete discretion to decide how large a system he will build.
78. Id. § 401(e). This section forbids the FCC and licensing authorities to "estab-
lish or adopt specifications respecting the... channel capacity of cable systems... "'
The capacity requirements in section 303(e) are specifically excepted from this provi-
sion.
79. See Goldberg Memorandum 2: "More importantly the bill relies upon the most
flexible mechanism of all in dealing with cable, that is, the free and competitive mar-
ketplace."
80. The operator is discouraged from underestimating the market, because he can
be required to lease all the channels except the ones needed for required retransmissions,
a public access channel, and two channels for his own originations. Proposed Act §
303(g)(2). Thus, if he intentionally (or unintentionally) underestimates the market,
building only enough channels for himself, he will be forced to give up some of his chan-
nels to lessees.
81. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) (1) (1973). However, the FCC will not allow a licens-
ing authority to require more than twenty channels. Clarification 16.
82. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (8) (1973). However, one commentator has suggested
that the cable operator could probably avoid actually expanding the system for a number
of years. See S. RPviaN, supra note 17, at 59-60.
83. Cf. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (1) (1973) (channel capacity requirements limited
t9 major markets?,
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OTP bill might actually force an increase in the capacity of systems
built in those areas.
Restrictions on Ownership of Cable Systems
The proposed Act places some conditional restrictions on the own-
ership of cable systems by those organizations which are already dis-
seminating information to the public or which might want to impede
the growth of cable TV because it would provide potential competition.
These groups, the approval of whose ownership is conditioned upon
how they use the system, include newspaper and magazine compan-
ies,8 4 owners of TV networks or broadcast stations, 85 and owners of
multiple systems.86 Ownership by any of these groups will be approved
if the cable operator limits his use to providing only the minimum serv-
ice of retransmitting required stations, a public access channel, and
one87 or twos" channels of programs originated by the operator. To
make sure that independent programmers are not foreclosed from the
market, all channels not used in providing this minimum service are
to be available for lease. While the free competition aimso of these
conditions is laudable, it is possible that independent programmers will
not want to use all of the excess channels. Thus, the public would be
deprived of additional programming because of the restrictions on these
particular types of owners. At a minimum these operators should be
given the option to import more signals and preferably to offer auto-
mated programming, at least on more than two channels 90
84. Proposed Act § 401(d). This authorization is actually phrased as a limitation
upon any governmental agency or state from prohibiting ownership if these conditions
are met.
85. Id. § 204(d). This restriction applies only to those cable systems located in
the areas served by these stations or networks.
86. Id. § 401(d).
87. Broadcast stations and networks are limited to only one channel for their pro-
gram originations. Id. § 204(d).
88. The allowable activity of owners of multiple systems and publishers of newspa-
pers and magazines is limited to that specified in section 303(g)(2) of the proposed
Act. See id. § 401(d). Section 303(g)(2) says that the cable operator "shall be per-
mitted to have no less than two channels available for program originatfons."
89. See Goldberg Memorandum 2.
90. The problem of the operator freezing out the independent should be minimized
because section 303(i) provides that the operator desiring to program channels must do
so through a separate corporation. These affiliated companies are to be given no better
terms than the independent programmers. Proposed Act § 303(i). An operator desiring
to offer automated programming should be allowed to do so on channels in addition to
the two channels that he is allowed for originations so long as he has channels available
for lease. Such programming can include news, stock market and sports tickers, message
wheels, music, advertising, or time and weather (this last type was offered on more than
half the cable systems operational in June, 1974, see TELEVISION FACra~oK 71-a). Pro-
gramming of this type would not pose a threat to diversity of local programming.
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Another restriction on ownership is aimed at any potential cable
system operator "who either directly or indirectly owns or controls ac-
cess to interconnection facilities serving cable systems, and also sup-
plies programming to channel programmers." 91 Such an operator will
be licensed only if he promises that he will not provide both intercon-
nection services and programming for fthe particular cable system which
he seeks -to operate.92 This provision prevents the program provider,
the supplier of interconnection services, and the cable operator from
being combined in one corporate entity. Its primary purpose is to pro-
tect a channel programmer who wants to lease channels in several dif-
ferent systems in order to form his own network from being forced by
a corporation performing all three functions to use only its programs on
its systems.93 Under this provision, a national network could not acquire
a cable system and then use its program origination channel94 to distrib-
ute its network programs locally. Although this provision allows net-
works to participate in the development of cable systems and thus re-
laxes the current regulations,9" it has sufficient safeguards to prevent
the national networks from abusing their strong economic positions.
Finally, the proposed Act generally prohibits telephone companies
from owning cable systems in -the areas where they provide phone serv-
ices.9" The purpose of this restriction is to avoid the inevitable dom-
ination of the industry by the telephone companies. Because 'tele-
phone companies already have in place extensive -transmission systems
which can readily be modified to include a cable system, their incre-
mental cost of establishing cable systems would be minimal. There is
no compelling reason to "give" the development of the cable industry
to the telephone companies, and the telephone industry might even
have positive reasons for retarding the cable industry.97  However, the
proposed Act does allow telephone companies 'to provide "transmission
An operator who does not originate "live" programs should be allowed to offer au-
tomated programming without being required to incorporate a programming affiliate.
This suggestion would expand a recommendation of the Cabinet Committee that cable
system owners be allowed to control programming if they offer no more than local sig-
nals plus one or two channels of automated programming. CCR 29 n.1.
91. Proposed Act § 303(d). See note 8 supra.
92. Id.
93. The possibility of an independent operator being squeezed out is suggested in
OCR 31.
94. Proposed Act § 204(d) allows a network-owned cable system to use one channel
for program origination.
95. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1973). See note 25 supra.
96. Proposed Act § 203(b)(3).
97. Cable systems might eventually provide telephone service on one channel. R.
SMITH, THE WIRED NATION 65 (1972).
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facilities used to distribute or disseminate electromagnetic signals from
the primary control center of a cable system to cable subscribers.""3
Control of the cable industry by the telephone companies is
already the subject of FCC regulations. 9  The regulations are similar
to the proposed Act, and the proposed Act seems -to recognize their
existence because section 203(b) authorizes 'the FCC "'to adopt or con-
tinue in force"' 0 rules and regulations relating to the participation of
telephone companies. The existing regulations are probably consistent
with the proposed Act. For example, it would appear that the FCC
could continue to waive the prohibition 0 1 because the language of the
bill is not a positive exclusion, but rather says that the FCC shall adopt
rules that "limit" telephone company ownership of cable systems. 10 2
Access to the Cable
The access provisions of the OTP bill deal with the problems of
giving independent programmers an opportunity to use cable and of
providing a "public access" channel. To help the independent pro-
grammers, the bill mandates'0 3 that operators with capacity in excess
of a minimum 04 must be required to make that excess capacity avail-
able to channel programmers. 05 The programmers to whom these
channels are made available may or may not be affiliated with the oper-
ator; the purpose seems to be to prevent an operator from building a
system and then using it only marginally. The licensing authorities are
98. Proposed Act § 203(b) (3). The effect of this provision is to authorize tele-
phone companies to build and lease back cable transmission facilities.
99. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-.57, 64.601-.602 (1974). The power of the FCC to im-
pose these regulations under section 2(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 152(a) (1970), was upheld in General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th
Cir. 1971).
100. Proposed Act § 203 (b) (emphasis added).
101. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.55, 64.602 (1974). A waiver is given in those situations
where "CATV service demonstrably could not exist except through a CATV system re-
lated to or affiliated with the local telephone common carrier. . . ... Id. § 63.55.
102. Proposed Act § 203(b) (3).
103. Id. § 303(f).
104. The minimum, set by a cross-reference to section 303(g) (2), is enough channels
that the operator may program two himself, retransmit all broadcast stations required
by the FCC, and provide a public access channel. In the case of systems involved in
cross-ownership situations, this minimum is also the maximum the operator may provide
-he may not use the excess even if no other programmer wants it-and in some cases
the minimum is even reduced by limiting the operator to one origination channel. See
notes 42-45, 84-90 supra and accompanying text.
105. Proposed Act § 303(g). This section would prevent a cable operator from mak-
ing his two origination channels the only origination channels in the system and would
frustrate any effort by a broadcaster to prevent full utilization of cable TV.
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directed to establish a mechanism whereby the operator is required to
make these channels available to unaffiliated programmers as de-
mand from independent programmers for leased channels increases."' °
Apparently, the intent of this second provison is to allow most cable
operators'0 7 to program the full capacity of their systems. Then, as
demand develops from independent programmers, the cable operator
would have to give up some of his channels or build more channels
in order to meet unfulfilled demand.'08 The cable operator can be re-
duced to the point where he has channels available only for required
retransmission, two channels for program origination, and one channel
for public access. 10  This provision may discourage operators
from spending money to program more than two channels or -to import
broadcast stations that are not required. However, the operator
could protect his investment in building up audiences for the programs
on these additional channels by enlarging the capacity of his system,
and it is in the public interest -to encourage him -to make channels avail-
able. The bill should specifically require that the operator be given
a grace period, perhaps six months, after unfulfilled demand reaches
the critical point before he is required to surrender a channel on which
he has programming in order that he may have time to install new capa-
city if he chooses. 10  The effect of this access provision would be to
106. Id. § 303(g)(1).
107. Not all operators will be permitted to use any more than the minimum from
the beginning because of the cross-ownership restrictions. See notes 42-45, 84-90 supra
and accompanying text.
108. This interpretation of section 303 (g) is presented in the Goldberg Memorandum
14. The section actually says that the licensing authority shall "require that channel
capacity available for lease to channel programmers having no ownership affiliation
with the cable operator be increased in proportion to the total channel capacity of the
system. . . ." Unfortunately, the language used for this section seems to be an obscure
and indirect treatment of the important question of when the cable operator must give
up to his potential competitors channels that he is using. Clarity is particularly needed
at this point because the licensing authority must devise a formula at the time that the
license is granted, and this obscure reference to proportion gives inadequate guidance
since it will be difficult, if not impossible, to devise such a proportion without knowing
how many channels will be needed. This provision could be clarified by requiring sim-
ply an increase, with no reference to proportion. That way, the license could simply
require that the operator supply the channels for leasing (at least until all were in use
and he and his affiliates were using only the minimum provided by section 303(g)(2))
whenever demand justified leasing a new channel. This demand could be computed on
the basis of the extent of usage of channels, as in 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (8) (1973),
or on the basis of firm offers to lease that were declined for lack of an available channel.
109. Proposed Act § 303(g) (2).
110. The bill should also allow the operator some channels to retransmit more broad-
cast stations than are required, so that he may provide at least some minimum service
such as all three networks plus an independent.
Furthermore, the bill should provide that the operator must be allowed at least two
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deprive the FCC of the power to enforce its current regulations that a
cable operator must make available a channel to a programmer when
his system is loaded to capacity.111 This problem would be handled
under the bill by -the local licensing authority.
The second provision concerning access to channels is a prohi-
bition of any requirements that the cable operator dedicate channels to
particular uses, except that a licensing authority may require that one
channel be made available without charge to all comers for any nonbus-
iness presentations." 2 This will be a significant change from the cur-
rent FCC rules, which require such a "public access" channel' 3 and
also require one channel to be dedicated to local government use and
another dedicated to use by the local education authorities," 4 both
without any charge."x 5
The general prohibition of mandatory dedicated channels is a
sound provision, for it will frustrate any attempt to force cable operators
to subsidize local government and education. If the governmental and
educational services do benefit from use of a channel, as indeed they
probably would," 6 -then the cost should be borne by the entire com-
munity, not just by the cable system or its subscribers and channel less-
ees whose costs would be influenced by these demands on the sys-
tem. 1 7 The government and education authorities should bid in the
market for channels.
The public access channel, where it is required, will force the op-
erator to provide a service to benefit the community. However, -two
channels for automated programming, as well as two for nonautomatic origination: the
sorts of services that can be offered by automatic programming may not be offered by
any programmer except the operator, since inserting advertising may add prohibitively
to the expense of such programming. See note 90 supra.
111. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (8) (1973).
112. Proposed Act § 401(b).
113. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (4) (1973).
114. Id. §§ 76.251(a) (5), (6).
115. Cable Television Report and Order f 123-24. The requirement that there be
no charge for these two channels is regarded as experimental by the FCC. Id.
116. The uses for such channels are myriad. For instance, governments can use
their channels as closed circuit systems for training police and firemen, with such fea-
tures as live cablecasts of fires to permit remote supervision (a closed channel, not
available to the public, might be appropriate for such programs) and for providing em-
ployment information to the public. School systems can use their channels for conven-
tional TV classes, for special lectures by experts videotaped at the expert's convenience,
or for continuing education programs.
117. While some programs would directly benefit only subscribers (such as continu-
ing education), any uses for internal government or education affairs-training, school
programs-would benefit the entire community, and in cases where only subscribers ben-
efit directly it is to be anticipated that the community as a whole will benefit indirectly.
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elements distinguish this from the forbidden government and education
channels. First, short programs by private groups, for nonbusiness pur-
poses, might not be possible unless there is a channel set aside for
them. Second, the cost to the operator of providing this channel will
be merely the loss of potential channel lease revenue from one channel,
whereas under the FCC rules the operator must give up three channels.
It is still a burden, of course, and still involves making the system pay
for something, out of the pockets of its shareholders or its subscribers
and channel lessees, that is thought to benefit the whole community.
However, this may be the only feasible way to provide such a channel,
and it will cost the system little since it merely uses one channel that
can be taken into account in planning the system; thus, this require-
ment may be legitimately imposed as a cost of doing business.
Regulation of Program Content
One of the most heartening aspects of the proposed Act is the
broad guarantee in section 401 of the cablecaster's right to freedom
of expression:
No executive agency of the United States ... and no State or political
subdivision or agency thereof ... shall:
(a) require or prohibit program originations by a cable operator
or channel programmer, or impose upon such operator or programmer
any restrictions or obligations affecting the content of such program
originations, including rights of response by any person, opportunities
for appearances by candidates for public office, or requirements for
balance -and objectivity .... 118
The remainder of the provision makes it clear that the section will not
affect civil or criminal liability for defamation, obscenity, incitement,
invasion of privacy, false advertising, "or other similar laws." 119 This
qualification might seem unnecessary, but one desirable result of it
would be to reinforce the point that the first amendment guarantees
are intended to be very broad since the qualification suggests that the
guarantees cover everything not excepted. Its presence will help re-
fute any future suggestions that other, unexpressed exceptions were to be
implied from the provision. Section 401(a), if enacted, would be a
clear and welcome departure from the current FCC rules, which wood-
118. Proposed Act § 401.
119. Id. The provision also states the common-sense doctrine that cable system oper-
ators should not be held liable for offenses committed on programs originated by unaf-
filiated programmers. A contrary provision would attempt to make the operator a guar-
antor of program content over which he would generally exercise no control.
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enly apply the right-of-reply and other doctrines to cable as well as
broadcast TV.120  The proposed Act would recognize that cable TV
is not bound by -the same physical restraints that apply to broadcast
TV"' and that therefore the application of these doctrines to cable
cannot be predicated upon a scarcity of channels.122  Nevertheless, it
might be objected that the likelihood of a cable operator's having a local
monopoly of cable123 justifies content controls. 24  However, the trend
toward newspaper monopolies or virtual monopolies in the large cities
has not been accepted as a justification for constricting newspapers' first
amendment freedoms. 25 Furthermore, if the bill is enacted in its
present form, there will be provisions which assure a multiplicity of
views on an individual cable system; cable operators will be required
to make at least half of their channels available for lease,'26 and they
will probably be required to retransmit all locally available broadcast
stations. 2 7 The conclusion, therefore, must be that in replacing the
present FCC doctrines with a clear first amendment guarantee, the
drafters have recommended the proper approach.
Protection of Privacy
An important safeguard for the individual subscriber is provided
in section 503, which contains a general prohibition of cabletapping
120. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1973). See note 24 supra. On fairness in broadcasting,
see 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) (reference to broadcasters having an "obligation . . .
to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance"), and Federal Communications
Comm'n, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues
of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,416, 40 F.C.C. 598, 2 P & F RADIO REa. 2d
1901 (1964) (public notice).
121. See note 9 supra.
122. Scarcity is one main element permitting the fairness requirement in broadcast-
ing. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), upheld the fairness doc-
trine requirement partly on the ground that "the First Amendment confers. . . no right
to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied
others the right to use," id. at 391, and the Court stated that "tlhere is no sanctuary
in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not
open to all," id. at 392. See Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71
COLum. L. REv. 1008, 1017-18 (1971).
123. Cable has been called "a technical or natural monopoly at the local level,"
largely because it would be uneconomical to operate a second cable system in an area
already served by one. R. POSNER, CABLE TELEvisION: THE PROBLEM OF LocAr
MONOPOLY 1 (1970).
124. The FCC has apparently suggested this approach. See Goldberg Memorandum
16. This may be interpreted, however, as referring only to channels programmed by
the operator.
125. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-50, 254-55 (1974).
126. See notes 103-10 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 20, 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
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and of the disclosure by cable operators or channel programmers of
personally identifiable information about a subscriber or his viewing
without his consent.12s  While this broad protection is desirable, three
omissions seriously weaken its value. First, the bill speaks only in
terms of disclosure and does not forbid the unauthorized collection and
storage of information, despite the fact that the latter would also be a
serious abuse if, for example, a cable operator were to collect data on
individual subscribers' preferences in political or "adult" programming.
The best approach would be to provide for a blanket prohibition of dis-
closure, collection, and storage of information, with specified exempt-
ions to serve legitimate purposes. For example, it would be reasonable
to exempt information collected for billing, for audience surveys, for
profitability research by the operator, and for technical quality con-
trol.12  A second weakness of the privacy section is that its protections
would not extend to governmental action.'30 The federal wiretapping
statute does not apply to cable systems,' and some express provisions
128. Proposed Act § 503:
In order to protect the privacy and security of cable communications, no per-
son shall intercept or receive program originations or other communications
provided by means of a cable system unless authorized by the cable operator,
the program originator or other sender of the communication; and no cable op-
erator, or channel programmer, shall disclose personally identifiable informa-
tion with respect to a cable subscriber or the programming or other communi-
cations service provided to or received by a subscriber by means of the cable
system except with the consent of the subscriber, or except pursuant to a court
order authorizing such disclosure. If a court shall order disclosure, the cable
subscriber shall be notified of such order by the cable operator or other person
to whom such order may be directed, within a reasonable time before the dis-
closure is to be made.
Another aspect of privacy is protected in the proposed Act by the requirements that
subscribers be informed of the nature of programs before reception of them, and that
devices be provided to enable each subscriber to lock out programming he does not wish
to receive. Id. § 203(b) (2).
129. It might also be desirable to provide that the FCC or licensing authorities have
the power to promulgate rules concerning how long information of specified types may
be retained. The periods would vary with the length of time reasonably necessary to
utilize the information in the authorized manner. For example, information concerning
viewer habits is no longer appropriately retained in individual form for any period of
time after being synthesized, and in such cases only a very short time period would be
allowed.
130. The prohibitions of section 503 apply only to persons, see note 128 supra, and
governments are not "persons" within the contemplation of the Act, see note 146 infra.
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1970). This statute makes it a crime to inter-
cept "any wire or oral communication." However, it does not apply to cable TV be-
cause the communication has to be via common carrier, id. § 2510(l)--cable TV
operators are not considered to be common carriers-and the prohibition on interception
of the message applies only to "aural acquisition," id. § 2510(4). Further, another wire-
tap statute, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970), relating to interception of wire or radio commu-
nication, also fails to provide any protection because the potentially relevant provisions
are limited to radio communications.
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applicable to government conduct would be a significant protection for
the public. A final weakness is the absence of appropriate sanctions;
a provision making willful noncompliance with -this section a misde-
meanor and allowing for punitive damages would encourage the ob-
servance of safeguards which are clearly important to the subscriber.
Allocation of Nonfederal Regulatory Authority
Under the OTP bill, states would be required to vest exclusive au-
thority in one entity to regulate licensing and the other nonfederal as-
pects of cable TV in a particular area.' Therefore, once a county
or municipal body 3 ' was given powers over local cable TV, state regu-
132. The basic operative provision is section 301:
A cable licensing authority shall have exclusive authority under state law to
execute and enforce the provisions of section 303 [the licensing section] and
adopt all other rules, regulations, and procedures respecting those activities
characteristic of cable system construction and operation as are consistent with
the provisions of this Act, and are not exclusively reserved to the Commission
by Title 1, or forbidden to an executive agency of the United States, a State,
or any agency thereof by Title IV of this Act. Proposed Act § 301.
It should be noted that the exclusive authority would extend only to matters which are
characteristic of cable systems. Presumably, other entities could regulate such matters
as insurance requirements or safety standards. See Goldberg Memorandum 11.
The Act also contains a broad grant of lawmaking and rulemaking power:
A state, or any political subdivision or agency, board, commission or authority
thereof, may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or
standard affecting cable systems, provided, that such law, rule, regulation or
order or standard is consistent with the exclusive grants of authority under Ti-
tle II and Title III of this Act, is not forbidden to any governmental authority
under Title IV of this Act, and does not otherwise create an undue burden on
the interstate commerce in cable communications. Proposed Act § 104(c).
Since section 104(c) is expressly made subject to the exclusive-authority rule of section
301, the combined effect of the two sections is to give licensing authorities exclusive
lawmaking and rulemaking powers over matters characteristic of cable systems.
A state legislature, having designated cities (or a state agency) as licensing authori-
ties, would not be permitted to enact laws regulating cable TV because that would violate
the requirement for exclusive authority. This is not explicit in the proposed Act, but
it is implicit. It is doubtful that the omission of the word "law" from section 301 was
intended to allow state legislatures to provide statutory regulation of the local incidents
of cable TV while local licensing authorities exercised rulemaking powers over the same
regulatory aspects of cable TV. Such an interpretation would nullify the exclusive-
authority provisions, since the legislatures could pass even the most minor regulation as
a formal statute or "law," thus overruling local regulations at will. It is probable, how-
ever, that the section 301 requirement that exclusivity arise "under state law" would give
legislatures at least implied authority to change their minds on where to vest these ex-
clusive powers; a legislature would not be irrevocably committed to its initial choice.
It should also be noted that under the proposed Act a state could delegate exclusive
authority to particular entities, such as specified cities, in their respective jurisdictions
while retaining exclusive powers over the rest of the state. This scheme would likewise
be generally consistent with the views of the FSLAC majority's "Federal Plus One" doc-
trine. See FSLAC 47-48. See note 134 infra.
133. Section 105(f) of the proposed Act defines a "cable licensing authority" as "any
state, county, municipality, or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency, commis-
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lation in that locality would have to cease. In thus endorsing the "Fed-
eral Plus One" position of the FSLAC report,1 4 the bill would impose
an unnecessary rigidity upon the regulatory structure and would be an
unwarranted intrusion upon the states' prerogative to manage their in-
ternal affairs. The states should be left free to experiment with dif-
ferent approaches under which states and localities cooperate in regu-
lating cable. For example, it might be found best for local licensing
authorities to control the day-to-day operations of cable, subject to gen-
eral standards promulgated by the state; such a scheme would be for-
bidden by the proposed Act.135 The evil at which these provisions are
aimed is presumably the problem of duplicative regulation. 36 How-
ever, any duplication serious enough to justify such restrictions could
be dealt with under another provision of the present bill, which inval-
idates nonfederal regulation that unduly burdens the interstate com-
merce in cable communications.' 3 7  Problems of duplication which
would be too trivial -to constitute such a burden are not of sufficient
magnitude to warrant the restrictive exclusive-authority provisions.
The best approach would 'be to eliminate the restrictions altogether and
sion, board, or authority thereof, that is empowered by law to authorize by license, fran-
chise, permit or other instrument of authority, the construction and operation of a cable
system within the jurisdiction of such agency."
134. As a remedy for possible duplicative regulation at the local level, a twelve mem-
ber majority of the FSLAC recommended that the FCC should totally preempt regula-
tion of cable, but not occupy certain areas so long as states enact laws providing that
only one level of state or local government will regulate those areas. FSLAC 46-47.
Thus, a cable operator could not be regulated by both a state and a municipal licensing
authority. This approach is known as "Federal Plus One." In contrast, the minority
suggested that this restrictive approach is unnecessary, that three-tier (FCC-state-local)
regulation is not inevitably duplicative and dilatory, and that the FCC could not consti-
tutionally enforce this provision even if Congress granted the FCC this authority.
FSLAC 83-84. See generally id. at 86-105. The constitutional problem derives from
the fact that, since local governments are creatures of the states, the powers given to
them must derive from the states and not be subjected to congressional allocation. See
FSLAC 97-101; cf. Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (Congress cannot extend state courts' jurisdiction in manner contrary to state
law).
135. Any attempt by the state to assert supervisory or other general powers over local
licensing authorities would constitute "rules, regulations, and procedures" in contraven-
tion of the exclusive-authority requirement of section 301.
The Cabinet Committee did not recommend any such exclusionary scheme, and in
fact suggested that "[s]tates could provide overall guidance and assistance to local au-
thorities in their franchising activities" and specifically mentioned that "[ilf ultimately
required, states could also oversee the reasonableness of customer connection charges
... " In short, even if localities are the licensing authorities, states should have a
role. CCR 42.
136. See FSLAC 39-42. See generally id., Pt. H, at 31-54.
137. See Proposed Act § 104(c), quoted in note 132 supra.
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thereby grant the states sufficient flexibility to adjust the regulatory pat-
tern as experience might require.
Regulation of Subscriber Charges and Franchise Fees
The OTP bill contains two provisions relating to the financial as-
pects of cablecasting. One of these provisions implements OTP's phil-
osophy that cablecasting should be subject to competitive market
forces; 13 8 it prohibits the, government from directly regulating rates
charged advertisers and from regulating the "rates charged chan-
nel programmers by cable operators for the use of channels or time
on such channels for a period of ten years after the effective date of
this Act . . . ."I" However, to protect individual consumers whose
bargaining power is much weaker than -that of channel programmers,
the OTP bill does allow the licensing authority to fix or regulate the
rates that the cable operator charges subscribers for installation, main-
tenance, and regular service. 40 Since cable TV is still in its infancy,
the policy adopted by the OTP seems to be an appropriate one. More
government regulation of rates might preclude the possibility of earning
attractive profits and thus retard the investment of capital necessary for
a rapid development of the cable industry. 4'
The second financial provision allows the FCC and the licensing
authority to charge an operator a reasonable franchise fee.' 42 This sec-
138. Goldberg Memorandum 2.
139. Proposed Act § 401(f). The prices could nevertheless be indirectly regulated
by means of an antitrust suit brought by the government or by private persons.
140. Id.
141. See id. § 103(d). One purpose of the proposed Act is to assure that cable TV
is "allowed to compete in the marketplace with other communications media." Id.
See also Goldberg Memorandum 19.
142. Proposed Act § 401(c). The current practice of the FCC is to charge a licens-
ing fee of thirty cents per subscriber per year. 47 C.F.R. § 1.1116(b) (1973). This
rule is intended, according to id. § 1.1101, to implement the Independent Offices Appro-
priation Act of 1952, 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970). The FCC rule was challenged in Na-
tional Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974), which held
that the fee was permissible only if based upon the "value to the recipient" of the FCC
services, id. at 342-43. In other words, Congress gave the FCC authority to levy a fee
but did not delegate its taxing power to the FCC. The case was remanded for the
FCC to take further proceedings. Id. at 344.
Under the present regulations, the local licensing authority is permitted to charge
the operator a reasonable fee "e.g., in the range of 3-5 percent of the franchisee's gross
subscriber revenues per year from cable television operations in the community (includ-
ing all forms of consideration [paid to the operator], such as initial lump sum pay-
ments)." 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(b) (1973). However, rates above three percent are
permitted only in special cases. See Clarification 93, 101-06.
The language of the OTP bill may have unintentionally precluded the possibility
of a licensing authority's charging an annual rate. The bill speaks in terms of the fee
Vol 197j:931
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
tion, however, prohibits the licensing authority from subjecting the cable
operator, channel programmers, or cable subscribers to any special tax
which is predicated solely on their use or operation of a cable system. 14
The effect of this provision should be to help insure that the cost of
being a cable subscriber is not inflated with artificial costs and is con-
sistent with a policy of expanding the industry.
Judicial Authority
The proposed Act has only two provisions authorizing access to
the courts. Under section 501, aggrieved persons may challenge in
state court any "act, practice, or omission" by a licensing authority or a
cable operator on the grounds of noncompliance with the Act or state
or local laws pursuant to the Act.144  Federal district courts are given
jurisdiction, without regard to citizenship or the amount in controversy,
of any action which could have been brought under section 501.145 Al-
though these provisions cover most parties whose right to sue might
being imposed "upon the issuance of certificates of compliance [by the FCC] or issuance
of licenses." Proposed Act § 401(c). If this language is interpreted to mean that the
licensing authority can only charge a lump sum amount, this provision is unwise because
it will increase the amount of capital that an operator will need initially to set up a
system. If this provision is unchanged, it would be better for the development of the
cable industry to construe the "upon issuance" language only as a condition precedent
with no implications for how the fees may be collected.
143. Proposed Act § 401(c).
144. Id. § 501:
Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any act, practice, or omission
of a cable licensing authority or cable operator may bring an action in a court
of competent jurisdiction to challenge such act, practice, or omission, on the
ground that it does not comply with the provisions of this Act or the provisions
of a statute, ordinance or law of a State, or political subdivision thereof, in-
tended to implement or apply the provisions of this Act.
It is noteworthy that by its terms this proposed statute would not provide an action based
upon noncompliance with a federal or state rule pursuant to the proposed Act. This
anomaly should be cured by changing the bill to read "or the provisions of a statute,
ordinance, law, rule, regulation, or other requirement of the United States or any agency
thereof, or of a State, or agency or political subdivision thereof, intended ... .
The most important aspect of this change would be that it would allow subscribers or
others to sue the cable operator if he did not comply with FCC rules. At the state level,
this change would be useful if the state's general administrative law did not permit suit
because of violation of the licensing authority's rules.
145. Id. § 502. A licensing authority will be a governmental entity. See note 133
supra. Therefore, it is possible that a defense to a suit under the proposed Act might
be based upon sovereign immunity or the eleventh amendment. Congress has the power
to remove a state's sovereign immunity. Comment, Implied Waiver of a State's Elev-
enth Amendment Immunity, 1974 DuKn LJ. 925, 940 n.82. Thus, the state court suit
of section 501 is clearly free from objections based upon such immunity. The validity
of the federal court suit provision is a far more complex problem. There is controversy
as to the power of Congress to remove a state's eleventh amendment immunity. See
id. at 939-54.
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otherwise be in doubt, 46 they are significantly weakened by the lack
of a damage remedy; the limitation of suits 'to challenges of acts, prac-
flees, and omissions seems to speak in terms of injunctive relief. Pos-
sible abuses by cable operators (for example, disclosing private inform-
ation about subscribers) would seem to be particularly remediable
through monetary awards. To avoid any question as to the availability
of such a remedy, the bill should clearly authorize both state and federal
courts to provide whatever relief is appropriate. A further problem
arises from the fact that only rarely would an abuse against an indivi-
dual subscriber call for a large damage award. The lack of a jurisdic-
tional amount for federal court suits is one appropriate way to deal with
this problem; however, to reduce the expense of bringing suits, the stat-
ute should expressly provide for a class action by similarly aggrieved
persons. This remedy would be an effective response to large-scale
abuses affecting many subscribers. The expenses of such a class action
could be further reduced by allowing notice to be given over the cable
system.147
CONCLUSION
The proposed Cable Communications Act is welcome as an at-
tempt to establish uniform statutory regulation of cable TV. The bill
would incorporate several features which are clearly desirable in -terms
of national policy. Notable among these are the broad prohibition of
content controls for originated programs, the choice of ownership re-
strictions, the disallowance of a dedicated channels requirement, and
the rules concerning subscriber and franchise fees. Unfortunately, the
bill would also commit the nation to unwise policies in several areas.
Too much power would be granted to the FCC to restrict the retrans-
146. The licensing authority would not qualify as a section 501 "person," see Pro-
posed Act § 105(g) ("person" defined as "individual, partnership, association, joint stock
company, trust, or corporation"), and therefore would not have the right of action given
by section 501. The only party likely to be sued by a licensing authority is a cable
operator, the terms of whose license would certainly include amenability to suit in state
court. A cable operator's suit against subscribers (for example, on an overdue bill),
channel lessees (for example, to enforce a leasing contract), and other parties would
fall within the state courts' jurisdiction over contracts, torts, and other traditional sub-
ject areas.
147. Costs of notification must be borne by the plaintiffs. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). In that case, the cost of mailing notice originally
would have been $225,000, or $315,000 by the time the Supreme Court decided the case.
Id. at 167 & n.7. Eisen, however, involved a class of six million members, id. at 166;
suits against cable operators are unlikely to involve such large classes, since the largest
systems currently have less than one hundred thousand subscribers. See TELEVISiON
FAcrBooK 70-a.
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mission of broadcast stations, thus making it possible for the FCC to
serve broadcasters at the expense of the national interest in developing
cable TV. The requirement that cable licensing authorities exercise
exclusive control over cable in their jurisdictions is an unnecessary re-
striction upon the states. Furthermore, the provisions guaranteeing
subscribers' privacy should be expanded to protect against invasion by
the government and to provide for sanctions. Finally, a class action
against cable system operators should be allowed in -the federal courts,
with no jurisdictional amount and with notice to be given on the cable
system. The bill has much to recommend it, but there is clearly a need
for improvement; these changes should be made before the bill is en-
acted, or, ideally, even before it is sent to Congress.
